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ABSTRACT
This paper outlines a theory of radical democratic education 
by addressing a key concept in Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy: articulation. Through their concept of 
articulation, Laclau and Mouffe attempt to liberate Gramsci’s 
theory of hegemony from Marxist economism, and adapt it 
to a political sphere inhabited by a plurality of struggles and 
agents none of which is predominant. However, while for 
Gramsci the political process of hegemony formation has an 
explicit educational dimension, Laclau and Mouffe ignore this 
dimension altogether. My discussion starts with elaborating 
the concept of articulation and analysing it in terms of three 
dimensions: performance, connection and transformation. 
I then address the role of education in Gramsci’s politics, in 
which the figure of the intellectual is central, and argue that 
radical democratic education requires renouncing that figure. 
In the final section, I offer a theory of such education, in which 
both teacher and students articulate their political differences 
and identities.
Introduction
Democratic education, like democracy in general, seems to have fallen into a deep 
crisis in both theory and practice. The foundation upon which classical democracy 
is presumed to rest is torn by tensions between the principles of equality and 
individual rights, between the nation-state and indigenous and migrant cultures, 
between identities and differences. I believe that a way out of this conundrum 
may be found in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s 1985 Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, hereafter HSS). In this book, the authors develop 
a political theory without an ultimate foundation, which acknowledges the tension 
between democracy and liberalism as well as the constructedness and fluidity of 
every identity. However, the radical democratic theory articulated in this book 
has hardly affected educational discourse, and the few attempts by educational 
© 2017 informa uK Limited, trading as taylor & Francis Group
KEYWORDS
democratic education; 
articulation; intellectuals; 
Ernesto Laclau; chantal 
Mouffe
CONTACT itay snir   itaysnir@gmail.com
2   I. SNIR
theorists to engage it focus on Laclau’s or Mouffe’s later works, thereby missing 
much of the complexity and radicalness of their coauthored book (Ruitenberg 
2008; Biesta 2011; Szkudlarek 2011, 2013). In this paper I outline a theory of radi-
cal democratic education by addressing a key concept in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy: articulation.
Articulation usually means either a joint or juncture between bones, or the 
act of linguistic expression, putting something into words to make sense. Laclau 
and Mouffe join these two semantic fields together, and add a third, sociopolit-
ical one: in their political theory articulation means ‘any practice establishing a 
relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the 
articulatory practice’ (HSS, 105). That is to say, when individual or collective sub-
jects engage in political articulation they do not form a coalition or aggregate 
in which each element retains its original identity, or a union which requires 
renunciation of former identities, but rather create a hegemonic front whereby 
the identity of each subject is reshaped. Through their concept of articulation, 
Laclau and Mouffe attempt to liberate Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony 
from Marxist economism, and adapt it to a political sphere inhabited by a plu-
rality of struggles and agents none of which is predominant. However, while for 
Gramsci the political process of hegemony formation has an explicit educational 
dimension, Laclau and Mouffe ignore this dimension altogether – they fail to 
articulate it, so to speak.
My discussion starts with elaborating the concept of articulation and analyzing 
it in terms of three dimensions: performance, connection and transformation. I 
then address the role of education in Gramsci’s politics, in which the figure of 
the intellectual is central, and argue that radical democratic education requires 
renouncing that figure. In the final section, I offer a theory of such education, in 
which both teacher and students articulate their political differences and identities.
Articulation and hegemony
Laclau and Mouffe understand democratic politics as ‘collective action, directed 
towards struggling against inequalities and challenging relations of subordina-
tion’ (HSS, 153). Starting from the French Revolution, the democratic-egalitarian 
principle of equality replaced the theological-political one, which had legitimized 
hierarchies by appealing to divine will, as ‘the new matrix of the social imaginary’ 
(HSS, 155). However, the fundamental opposition people/ancien régime, which was 
the dividing line along which demands for equality were organized at the time of 
the Revolution, soon turned out to be insufficient, for ‘the people’ disintegrated 
into multiple identities and demands which could not be satisfied by fighting the 
ancien régime. As a result, constructing the line dividing oppressors and oppressed 
became the primary political task (HSS, 151).
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Marxism was part of this democratic revolution, and its power in the second half 
of the nineteenth century derived from its ability to constitute a new frontier by 
bringing together various groups and demands for equality under the banner of 
class struggle. The impasse in which Marxism found itself in the twentieth century 
resulted above all from the decline of the proletariat’s unifying power, followed 
by its inability to account for the plurality of new social movements – feminist, 
ethnic, environmental and others – which removed class struggle from its privi-
leged position in democratic-egalitarian politics (HSS, 159). Laclau and Mouffe’s 
radical democracy aimed at combining the principle of democratic equality with 
a pluralist one, in an attempt to rethink the conditions of joint political struggle 
while acknowledging an open, contingent variety of democratic political subjects 
whose interactions could not be determined in advance:
The rejection of privileged points of rupture and the confluence of struggles into a uni-
fied political space, and the acceptance, on the contrary, of the plurality and indeter-
minacy of the social, seem to us the two fundamental bases from which a new political 
imaginary can be constructed, radically libertarian and infinitely more ambitious in its 
objectives than that of the classic left. (HSS, 152)
The key to this political theory is found in Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegem-
ony.1 In traditional Marxist thought, hegemony designates leadership by consent, 
namely domination enjoying popular legitimacy and requiring minimal use of 
violent coercion (Forgacs 2000, 137). But while Soviet Marxists like Lenin and 
Bukharin use this concept (in Russian: gegemonia) exclusively to describe the 
desirable relations between the proletariat and other groups it had to lead in the 
struggle against the bourgeoisie, in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks hegemony is not 
predetermined by the economic identities of the elements composing it. Gramsci 
insists that the nature of anti-capitalist hegemony should not be determined by 
the proletariat alone – other subordinated groups, such as peasants, have much 
to contribute to the form hegemony assumes (Gramsci 2000, 190–221). Hence, 
all the groups constituting hegemony – including the proletariat – influence and 
alter each other. Hegemony is not a relation between groups with given identities 
and interests, joining together in an alliance, but rather a complex process which 
reshapes all parties involved through dynamic interactions between ideas, tradi-
tions and practices (Mouffe 1979). It is a multidirectional process of generating a 
new common sense, through which the views and values of the group claiming 
leadership adjust to those of the other groups so as to appear not as particular 
interests but as expressions of the common good, of collective popular will (Femia 
1981, 46–48).
Laclau and Mouffe embrace the contingency of political identities implied by 
Gramsci’s politics of hegemony, but reject the ‘inner essentialist core’ of his thought 
(HSS, 69), namely his insistence that stable hegemony can be formed only in the 
context of class struggle. They employ the concept of articulation to explicate 
and radicalize the dynamics expressed by Gramscian hegemony, to make it the 
conceptual foundation for thinking of politics without foundation: ‘the concept of 
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hegemony supposes a theoretical field dominated by the category of articulation’ 
(HSS, 93; italics in the original). In what follows, I articulate the concept of articula-
tion by distinguishing between three aspects, which are not consequent phases 
but rather simultaneous dimensions making up articulatory practice: performance, 
connection and transformation.
According to traditional political thought, including both Jacobin and Marxist 
versions of democratic politics, society exists as a totality determining the meaning 
and identity of each of the elements constituting it. Thus, every frontier is internal 
to the social whole, and the nature of struggles against inequality as well as the 
identity of the political subjects able to lead them can be determined in advance 
(HSS, 152). Laclau and Mouffe employ the concept of articulation to challenge this 
presupposition and reject the determinism it implies:
In order to place ourselves firmly within the field of articulation, we must begin by 
renouncing the conception of ‘society’ as founding totality of its partial processes … 
There is no sutured space peculiar to ‘society,’ since the social itself has no essence. (HSS, 
95, 96)2
Instead, social space is composed of a plurality of discourses each of which allows 
but partial stabilization of meanings around a temporary ‘nodal point’ (HSS, 113). 
Hence, meanings and identities do not exist objectively, in a stable field of differ-
ences: they are constituted discursively in and through their articulations, realized 
only when performed by speaking and acting agents.
As discourses are unstable, mutable formations where utterances, gestures and 
objects are circulated (HSS, 105), Laclau and Mouffe write that ‘a discursive totality 
never exists in the form of a simply given and delimited positivity … there is no 
social identity fully protected from a discursive exterior that deforms it and pre-
vents it becoming fully sutured’ (HSS, 110, 111; italics in the original). Accordingly, 
no performance is merely a repetition of a given pattern; all necessarily involve 
unpredictable interactions: ‘all identity is relational – even if the system of relations 
does not reach the point of being fixed as a stable system of differences’ (HSS, 
113). In other words, articulation always involves connections; to articulate is to 
articulate with. However, unlike the encounter of elements whose identities are 
positively determined by a given social structure, the articulating elements have a 
‘floating character’ (ibid.) and therefore transform while performing and connect-
ing, thereby changing existing discourses or creating new ones (Laclau 2014a).
Although not every articulation is necessarily political, the logic of articulation 
sheds new light on the way political demands and struggles operate, as well as 
on the formation of hegemonic fronts. Laclau and Mouffe explain that political 
hegemony can be formed when the performance of discursive practices and iden-
tities generates antagonism, namely when it expresses the performer’s inability 
to be ‘totally himself,’ to have a close, objective identity within a stable system of 
differences: ‘In the case of antagonism … the presence of the “Other” prevents me 
from being totally myself’ (HSS, 125; see also Laclau 2014b; Mouffe 1999, 38–53; 
Mouffe 2005, 101; Mouffe 2006, 127, 128). This is, for example, a woman’s inability 
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simply to be a female human without the relation to a man defining and position-
ing her social-discursive identity, constituting her as inferior and making gender 
relations antagonistic. Hegemony is formed when various antagonistic relations 
connect so as to concentrate around a single frontier: this is the case, to continue 
the example, when the demands of the ‘woman’ and the ‘black’ coalesce under 
the umbrella of class struggle and become articulated in its terms.
Such connection forms a relation of ‘equivalence,’ in which ‘the identity of the 
object is split: on the one hand, it maintains its own “literal” sense; on the other, it 
symbolizes the contextual position for which it is a substitutable element’ (HSS, 
63). That is to say, in a chain of equivalence each demand for equality expresses 
not only itself but also something they all have in common (HSS, 128). Importantly, 
the common denominator has no positive identity, for the articulated demands 
originate in heterogeneous discourses; the nodal point around which hegemony 
consolidates is a ‘floating signifier’ (Laclau 1996, 36–46), a name that comes to 
signify, due to the process of articulation, not only a particular identity but also a 
universal shared by a plurality of demands and identities. This way, social space is 
divided into two opposing sides, ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Laclau 2006, 2007, 95) – as when 
the category of ‘class’ signifies in a given historical moment something shared by a 
variety of struggles – economic, feminist, racial, and others. Such a process clearly 
transforms the articulating elements, including the one whose name comes to 
signify the emerging hegemony; hence, hegemony itself is a fluid and dynamic 
collective subject, whose identity is constantly transforming.
Education and the intellectual
Political articulation has an obvious educational dimension: it involves learning, 
growing to understand each other and the development of identities into broader 
and more inclusive ones. Nevertheless, Laclau and Mouffe do not address this 
dimension, and barely touch upon educational issues in either their shared or 
individual works. This is especially surprising in light of the fact that in Gramsci, 
educational issues are explicit and crucial to the process of hegemony formation. 
A brief look at Gramsci’s view of education will provide a clue as to the reason why 
Laclau and Mouffe avoided educational questions, and more importantly enable 
to develop an educational approach based on their concept of articulation.
The problem of education arises in Gramsci’s thought due to the relative auton-
omy of consciousness, which is no simple reflection of the mode of production. 
Politics is accordingly not an epiphenomenon of economy but rather a continuous 
‘war of position’ over the masses’ consent and cooperation: this war takes place 
not in the battlefield or parliament, but rather in civil society and everyday life. It is 
waged over cultural and artistic productions, over understandings of traditions and 
religious beliefs, even over how words are understood – this is, then, a large-scale 
educational struggle over consciousness (Gramsci 2000, 225–230; Giroux 1999). 
The vanguard (or HQ) consists of the intellectuals, whose role is to educate ordinary 
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people and generate consent to hegemonic ideas and values. Traditional intellec-
tuals use their influence over the organization and distribution of knowledge and 
culture to make the worldview of the ruling class appear common-sensual, namely 
to facilitate public legitimacy for existing power relations. As a result of the work 
of such intellectuals, Gramsci writes, the common man
has formed views, convictions, discriminating criteria, and norms of behavior. Every sup-
porter of a viewpoint that contrasts with his own, being intellectually superior, knows 
how to argue his reasons more than a common man can do; he is able to overwhelm 
him with logic, and so on. Should common man, therefore, change his convictions? … 
Common man thinks that the many cannot go wrong, in contrast to what the opponent 
would have him believe. Even if he himself is, in truth, incapable of sustaining and artic-
ulating his own opinions as his opponent does, he is certain that there is in his group 
someone who knows how to do it, certainly even better than that particular opponent. 
In fact, he remembers having heard the reasons for his faith expounded widely and 
coherently, such that he has remained convinced. (quoted in Santucci 2010, 139, 140)
However, intellectuals also play a crucial role in the formation of counter hegem-
ony. Challenging the ruling hegemony and creating an alternative are possible, 
according to Gramsci, because notwithstanding the efforts of traditional intellec-
tuals, the ideological worldview of the masses is never a coherent whole. Thoughts 
and ideas are essentially connected to the lives of the people conceiving them, 
thereby reflecting the true nature of social reality. That is to say, although traditional 
intellectuals usually succeed in promoting the worldview of the ruling classes and 
making it appear self-evident, against this influence stands the practical everyday 
experience of the working classes, which also influences their common sense. 
Gramsci calls these authentic aspects of the workers’ common sense good sense: 
‘this is the healthy nucleus that exists in “common sense”, the part of it that can 
be called “good sense” and that deserves to be made more unitary and coherent’ 
(Gramsci 2000, 329).
Yet, although good sense expresses the genuine interests of the masses, it is 
usually not formulated clearly and eloquently, and is often not even fully conscious:
[T] he active man-in-the-mass has a practical activity, but has no theoretical conscious-
ness of his practical activity … One might almost say that he has two theoretical con-
sciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity 
and which in reality unites him with all his fellow-workers in the practical transformation 
of the real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from 
the past and uncritically absorbed. (Gramsci 2000, 333)
That is to say, people may act in ways that contradict what they state or think, not 
being fully aware of the positions implicit in what they do. They may feel oppres-
sion on their flesh and even express discontent or rage, but are often unable to 
come up with a reflective account of the meaning and causes of their experiences 
(Femia 1981, 31). Gramsci insists that ‘everyone is a philosopher,’ namely able to 
think critically, but in the absence of proper conceptual tools he lacks the means 
to formulate the radical alternative embedded in his practical experience and turn 
it into genuine resistance (Gramsci 2000, 325).3
ETHICS AND EDUCATION  7
Intellectuals are therefore required to help workers attain a higher level of reflec-
tive self-consciousness, give linguistic form to their good sense and explicate it 
as part of their class struggle. These intellectuals are not ‘traditional,’ but ‘organic,’ 
coming from amongst the oppressed and expressing their class interests. To be 
sure, the ‘subjects of history,’ the ultimate agents of political struggle, must be the 
working masses; but for this to happen, the intellectual must ‘throw himself, too, 
into practical life, and become an organizer of the practical aspects of culture … he 
must democratize himself’ (quoted in Santucci 2010, 143). To be sure, intellectuals 
democratize not by somehow being elected, but by virtue of the joint process 
they undergo with the masses: a process in which they do not only teach but 
also learn from the experiences of the workers and shape the proletarian hegem-
onic front according to the latter’s good sense (Mayo 1999). The work of organic 
intellectuals is therefore essentially educational, and as Michael Apple observes 
it is also the political task of contemporary democratic educators committed to 
‘interrupting the right’: instead of rejecting the students’ worldview, teachers have 
to be attentive to their experiences and cultures, select the good-sensical elements 
they contain, and reposition them within a progressive counter-hegemony (Apple 
2006, 2009).
Gramsci’s view is easily translated into Laclau and Mouffe’s vocabulary, in which 
hegemony is generated by articulatory practice. In their terms, the aim of the 
intellectuals is to help the workers articulate good sense: perform it linguistically, 
connect it to class struggle, and transform it into a moment of the hegemonic front. 
Indeed, various scholars have attempted to extricate from Laclau and Mouffe’s 
political theory educational insights aligned with Gramsci’s conceptualization 
of the teacher as an organic intellectual (Lewis 2012). Claudia Ruitenberg (2010) 
argues, in this vein, that an important but neglected educational-political task is 
teaching to articulate. She takes up Simon Critchley’s (2013, 7) claim regarding a 
deficit in political motivation due to the lack of ethical foundation to contempo-
rary secular liberal democracy, and argues that ‘in addition to an ethical deficit, 
an articulatory deficit plagues the contemporary political situation. Therefore, cit-
izens should learn not only to perceive ethical injustice … but also to form and 
articulate political demands’ (Ruitenberg 2010, 373, italics in the original). That is 
to say, articulation is a complex political practice, and does not simply follow the 
understanding that political struggle is necessary. Professional help is needed to 
provide the relevant knowledge without which political education is incomplete:
If a person has no idea how to translate her or his ideas about a desirable social order into 
actions that aim to bring this social order about, then I would argue that we cannot call 
this person ‘politically educated.’ Indeed, having some knowledge of how to translate 
one’s perceptions of injustice into actions that aim to lessen this injustice is part of what 
others have called ‘political efficacy’: the belief that one’s actions can make a political 
difference. Political efficacy combines the sense of agency and the ability to articulate 
one’s individual actions with those of others … and it is an important part of citizenship 
education that takes the political aspects of citizenship seriously. (Ruitenberg 2010, 377, 
378)
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The educator who teaches to articulate is akin to the Gramscian intellectual with-
out whom political articulation and the construction of democratic hegemony 
are impossible (Rømer 2011).
However, I believe that Laclau and Mouffe’s logic of articulation requires reject-
ing the figure of the intellectual, and the centrality of this figure in Gramsci’s theory 
of education may even offer a possible explanation for their avoidance of edu-
cational questions. Organic and democratic as he may well be, the intellectual 
knows and teaches – he knows in advance the frontier dividing the social field into 
two antagonistic sides, and teaches the ways good sense should be articulated. 
This brings an element of necessity into the contingent logic of articulation, and 
closes off political possibilities instead of accepting their radical plurality. Laclau 
and Mouffe write that ‘From the point of view of a hegemonic politics, then, the 
crucial limitation of the traditional left perspective is that it attempts to determine 
a priori agents of change, levels of effectiveness in the field of the social, and priv-
ileged points and moments of rupture’ (HSS, 178, 179). Hence, ‘there is no radical 
and plural democracy without renouncing the discourse of the universal and its 
implicit assumption of a privileged point of access to ‘the truth’ (HSS, 191, 192). 
This can easily be read as a rejection of the role Gramsci ascribes to intellectuals 
and of his theory of education altogether.
Although Laclau and Mouffe do not attack the Gramscian intellectual directly – 
and hence, this explanation for their avoidance of educational questions remains 
speculative – consistent elaboration of radical democratic politics in the field of 
education faces the challenge of ridding itself of the figure of the intellectual, of 
he who knows in advance. In the remainder of the article, I offer such elaboration 
by stressing the importance of articulation to democratic education.
Articulating radical democratic education
While dominant contemporary approaches to democratic education aim at incor-
porating the differences between students into the national-civic identity (Callan 
2004) or bridging over them by way of rational deliberation (Gutmann 1999), rad-
ical democracy opposes all forms of inequality and subordination, and therefore 
posits that the irreducible plurality of differences needs to be articulated so as to 
make inequalities visible. For democratic education to take place, students must 
perform their discursive identities: not only ‘be themselves,’ but rather actively 
engage the question, ‘What does it mean to be me?’ and reflect on and give lin-
guistic form to their social positions and their complex relations with other social 
positions. Such reflection is not directed inwards, to some alleged positive essence, 
but rather outwards, or more precisely towards the relations with the outside which 
constitute and give meaning to the inside. To be sure, this reflection should not 
be taken to be either rational or irrational, for the very definition of rationality and 
irrationality is dependent upon the relevant discourse – articulation is performance 
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and reshaping of experience itself, of the way one senses the world and makes 
sense of it.
Moreover, unlike the more conventional process of ‘discovering oneself,’ the 
performative aspect of articulation must have a public dimension: the discur-
sive identities and social relations need not only become more transparent to the 
articulating subject, but also appear as such to others – classmates, teachers, even 
parents – exposing to them new layers of social reality. Much like in Gramsci, this 
implies recognition that the students’ identities and experiences are politically 
important not only due to their psychological significance to individuals’ sense of 
agency and belonging, but also because they contain valuable truths regarding 
social reality and the numerous relations of oppression it harbors.
However, Laclau and Mouffe emphasize that not all relations of subordination 
appear as illegitimate oppression – inequality may be situated within a discourse in 
which it seems natural or justified (HSS, 153, 154). For such relations of subordina-
tion to become antagonistic, their articulation must connect them with discourses 
which will frame them as oppressive. Gender identity, for example, which often 
seems to reflect natural differences, may connect to the discourse of universal 
human rights so as to allow the subordination of women to men to emerge as a 
form of oppression and for a democratic demand for equality to arise.
Clearly the discourse of rights in this example does not replace the one in which 
the female student appears as a ‘natural woman,’ but rather interacts with it in a 
way that transforms them both: it is not only the student’s views that change, but 
rather the way she perceives and experiences herself, her world and the relations 
between the two. In other words, she transforms her very identity – the meaning 
of being a woman (or man), in class or anywhere else, does not remain the same 
after being articulated with the discourse of rights – and obviously, the meaning 
of a universal right also changes once understood also in the context of gender. 
Thus, the question ‘What does it mean to be me?’ never gets a definitive answer 
and must be constantly asked, carrying on the practice of articulation. In this sense 
radical democratic education differs from multicultural education, for performing 
and explicating the differences are not intended to strengthen or ‘empower’ them 
but to open them up for other discourses, allowing them to transform while con-
necting with each other – not, to be sure, in order to renounce traditional identities 
and compromise old demands, but rather to form chains of equivalences able to 
become a hegemonic front demanding radical transformation of existing power 
relations.
What is the teacher’s role in radical democratic education? It seems that the 
obvious answer is that she is to provide the nodal point for democratic articula-
tion, namely the discourse making available the concepts, meanings and practices 
that connect to each of the students’ particular identities and transform them 
into democratic demands in the chain of equivalence forming a hegemonic front. 
Although this answer leaves open the exact nature of the democratic discourse 
articulated by the teacher and does not limit it to class struggle, such a teacher 
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would nevertheless be a version of the Gramscian intellectual: she will know in 
advance the central frontier separating oppressors from oppressed, and her task 
would be to make sure all democratic demands are articulated around it. Her 
articulatory practice, in other words, will not be complete, as it will set a priori 
limits to the available connections and transformations.
To break away from the position of the intellectual, the teacher must not attempt 
to pass on skills or knowledge – not even that of radical democratic theory – but 
rather fully engage the practice of articulation. Rather than teaching how to articu-
late or attempting to influence articulation from the distant standpoint of the one 
who knows in advance, the radical democratic teacher is first and foremost another 
element – albeit a rather dominant one – in the field of differences undergoing 
articulation. For her, no less than for her students, the answer to the question ‘What 
does it mean to be me?’ is far from straightforward. She has to perform her views 
and social identity, connect to other views and identities, and of course transform – 
just like her students. To be sure, the articulating teacher’s subjective experience is 
secondary to the political effect she sets in motion. Rather than forcing a specific 
discourse on the various differences undergoing articulation, she allows the fron-
tier to rise from the demands articulated by the students, from what is important 
to them according to the discourses constituting their identities.
Such a teacher invites students of different identities to speak, learn and evolve 
together, without assuming the existence of a privileged discourse or an ultimate 
social identity all would have to assume. She acknowledges that everyone’s life 
experiences provide them with knowledge and critical insights into oppressive 
social relations, and consequently the ability as well as the need for each to both 
teach and learn from all the others. Although the generational gap between 
teacher and students does not entirely disappear, their subject positions are being 
deconstructed and rearticulated within a new democratic educational discourse. 
At the same time, the students as well as the teacher become full political subjects, 
in line with the Gramscian trend, endorsed by Laclau and Mouffe, of extending 
political subjectivity to hitherto excluded social agents.
However, the democratic teacher’s responsibility is not limited to providing 
the conditions and encouraging the students to engage in articulation, and she 
cannot remain indifferent to the specific nature articulations assume. Laclau and 
Mouffe make clear that there is nothing necessary in the ways different elements 
articulate, and no guarantee a demand for equality would be articulated with other 
democratic demands to form a democratic hegemony (HSS, 169). It certainly may, 
and often is, articulated with nationalist or neoliberal discourses in which some 
demands for equality come at the expense of others, and generate antagonism 
with other oppressed identities:
The democratic revolution is simply the terrain upon which there operates a logic of dis-
placement supported by an egalitarian imaginary, but that it does not predetermine the 
direction in which this imaginary will operate … [T] he discursive compass of the demo-
cratic revolution opens the way for political logics as diverse as right-wing populism and 
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totalitarianism on the one hand, and a radical democracy on the other. (HSS, 168; italics 
in the original; see also Mouffe 2005, 3)
For the direction indicated by the discursive compass to be that of democratic 
hegemony, the logic of equality must be accompanied with a pluralist logic, 
namely recognition of the equal right of different groups to demand equality, 
through an articulation creating equivalence between them without the one sup-
pressing the other (Smith 1998, 6–41).
Hence, although the radical democratic teacher does not provide the articu-
lating discourse and does not draw the frontier along which the struggle against 
inequalities consolidates, she is nevertheless responsible to do all within her power 
to direct the articulations – to articulate the principles of equality and pluralism 
in tandem so as to encourage the students to form the chains of equivalences 
accordingly. This responsibility concerns the democratic teacher not because she 
is a teacher but because she is democratic. Equally, it concerns every student 
committed to democracy. In any event, giving direction to articulation is not the 
same as providing it with content, and the democratic teacher is not pushed back 
to the position of the intellectual. Relying on the generational and structural dif-
ferences between teacher and students to impose a specific content is not only 
unethical – bringing radical democratic education too close to indoctrination – but 
also runs against the political core of such democracy, which combines equality 
with pluralism. Therefore, the teacher must not introduce philosophical or political 
theories to the students, but rather articulate the views and practices they bring to 
class. That is to say, various discourses can provide the democratic nodal point, and 
democracy can take on many forms within the democratic direction. The teacher 
should show the students where a certain path they take might lead, expose the 
inequalities resulting from some articulations of demands for equality, and offer 
alternative, more pluralist routes. To push Laclau and Mouffe’s metaphor a bit 
further, the teacher must offer a compass and a roadmap, not assume the role 
of navigator. Her role is negative in nature: to guard against undemocratic artic-
ulations without committing in advance to any specific nature of the democratic 
struggle. If she assumes a positive role, if she attempts to impose democracy from 
above, she undermines democracy itself; the egalitarian principle at the heart of 
democracy demands it to be articulated from the bottom up – from the students 
and not from an intellectual teacher. Nothing guarantees the success of democratic 
articulations in bringing about an egalitarian and pluralist hegemonic power, but 
setting a priori limits to political contingency compromises the radical nature of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s democracy.
Conclusion
Engaging in radical democratic politics in school may seem problematic compared 
to other forms of political education, as it involves generating antagonisms and 
forming hegemonic fronts dividing the social space into ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Does radical 
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democratic education mean creating antagonisms between students in class? 
Does it aim at splitting the class into rival parties? I believe that understanding the 
role of articulation in radical democracy entails negative answers. Articulation is 
not a means to an end in the form of political struggle, for it is already itself politi-
cal: by performing, connecting and transforming their identities and demands the 
students act politically, and if the chain of equivalence they form adheres to the 
principle of equality, their politics is democratic. This is exactly what Gramsci calls 
‘war of position’: an essential part of political struggle that does not involve out-
right confrontation. Political confrontation may indeed take place in school – for no 
place is an island free of oppression and immune to struggles against it – but this 
is not a necessary outcome of radical democratic education. Articulation is a long-
term, ongoing process which brings education and politics together, and does not 
stop at the school’s doorstep. Placing articulation at the center means bringing to 
the fore of democratic education practices of self-expression and collaboration. It 
means articulating – performing, connecting and transforming – education and 
democracy themselves.
Notes
1.  Gramsci did not invent this concept, and neither did his Marxist predecessors. As 
Peter Ives (2004, 63) notes, in ancient Greek hegemon means ‘leader,’ and the word has 
traditionally been used to designate a type of influence which is not total domination 
but rather a friendly albeit unequal alliance, in which the subordinated maintains a 
degree of autonomy (such was Athens’ influence over neighboring city-states).
2.  Laclau (1990, 89–93) distinguished between ‘society’ as a closed system and ‘the social’ 
as an open contingent formation.
3.  This view is part of the backbone of Marxist tradition. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 
Freire (1996, 34) quotes Lukács who says that the revolutionary ‘must, to use the words 
of Marx, explain to the masses their own actions.’
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